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One Step Further: 









The phenomenological attitude is essential for practising phenomenology. Many refer to wonder 
and wonderment as basic attitudes and ways of being present with and listening to phenomena. In 
this article a critical view is placed on the typically psychologically-loaded language and tonality 
that is used by phenomenological researchers in the human sciences in order to describe the 
wonder and openness they try to be a part of when doing phenomenology. With reference to the 
difference between Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s views on Socratic dialectics the author points to 
an ontological dimension in the phenomenology of wonder that cannot be reached by taking only 
an emotional-bodily-oriented approach (the psychological approach) or an aesthetical-intuitive-
oriented approach (the late Heidegger poeticised philosophizing). Instead this dimension must be 




Feelings accompany the metaphysical and 
meta-psychic factum of love, but they do not 
constitute it (…) Feelings one ‘has’; love 
happens. Feelings dwell in man; but man 
dwells in his love. 
 
  Martin Buber, Ich und Du, 1923 (my translation1) 
 
                                                 
1 In the  English translation of Martin Buber Ich und Du 
(1923), entitled I and Thou (2004; Continuum International 
Publishing Group), this sentence is translated as: ”Feelings 
are ’entertained’; love comes to pass. Feelings dwell in 
man; but man dwells in his love” (p. 19). However, in the 
original German text by Buber he writes: ”Gefühle werden 
»gehabt«; die Liebe geschieht. Gefühle wohnen im 
Menschen, aber der Mensch wohnt in seiner Liebe”. Thus, 
similar to Gadamer, but many years earlier, Buber 
emphasizes love as a ‘Geschehen’, as an ontological event 
that happens to us.  
Prelude 
 
Natality is one of these fine, beautiful and thought-
expanding words that flow from the language of 
philosophy and into the thinking and language of 
qualitative and educational research. Natality, in the 
understanding of the German-American philosopher 
Hannah Arendt, is described as a kind of 
philosophical presence, a way of being reborn into the 
world again through a philosophical wonder, and 
through a ‘putting yourself at play and at risk’, when 
thought and act melt together into a deedful action 
(Arendt, 1958, 1978).  
 
Other words and phrases of the same evocative and 
wondrous character include terms such as 
Gelassenheit (Heidegger), the inner word (Augustine/ 
Gadamer) and the ontological cipher (Merleau-
Ponty). These are all words that plainly have made, 
and continue to make, a deep impact on qualitative 
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and phenomenological research in human science, 
especially research that draws on the philosophy of 
existential and hermeneutic phenomenology.  
 
All these words, although in different ways, seem to 
point to a special kind of philosophical openness or 
the philosophical presence of ‘something’ that cannot 
be grasped directly through common scientific 
language or qualitative research methods or, I may 
add, through the particular presence and awareness 
created by a scientific-empirical approach or a 
qualitative-methodological approach. Nevertheless, 
these living philosophical experiences and presences 
are, as I will elaborate later, what seem to make us 
able to sense what ‘marks’ our perceptions and 
outspoken meanings from inside. In other words, as 
Merleau-Ponty (1964) writes, “It [phenomenology] 
must stick close to experience, and yet not limit itself 
to the empirical but restore to each experience the 
ontological cipher which marks it internally” (p. 157).   
 
To be in both an epistemological and an ontological 
relation and authentic dialogue with the life 
phenomena the researcher wants to understand, calls 
for a special form of phenomenological attitude and a 
hermeneutical awareness of the fundamental finitude 
of humans’ perceptions and understandings. In this 
article I want to dwell upon how we – as qualitative 
and phenomenological researchers – can understand 
and practice this phenomenological attitude and 
hermeneutic awareness through want I have 
tentatively called a ‘living philosophical experience 
and presence’.  
 
In this article I intend to raise many questions: What 
does it mean to think and live within and from this 
philosophical presence and experience? What does it 
mean to philosophize in this way as a phenomeno-
logical researcher? Should psychologists, educators, 
nurses and qualitative researchers as such become 
able to philosophize in order to do proper 
phenomenological descriptions and analysis? And can 
they philosophize at all? Is it only professional 
philosophers who are able to do so and who have ‘a 
license to philosophize’? Should the psychologist, 
nurse or educator instead just stick to his or her 
scientific discipline and profession and let the 
professional philosophers do what they are best at?  
 
These questions raise other thoughts. I would argue 
that professional philosophers slip away from and 
lose sight of the subject matter (die Sache) in their 
eagerness to pursue logical argumentations, concept 
analysis and all kinds of philosophical methods in 
order to look for clarifications, definitions, general 
statements and philosophical systems. In my view the 
academic philosophers – even the professional 
philosophers of phenomenology – have a tendency to 
get too abstract in their theoretical writings so that 
they do not get into an authentic meeting and dialogue 
with the phenomena.  
 
Hannah Arendt (1978) seems to warn against this 
kind of professional philosophizing when she notes: 
  
The question, when asked by the professional 
[philosopher], does not arise of his own 
experiences while engaging in thinking. It is 
asked from outside – whether that outside is 
constituted by his professional interests as a 
thinker or by common sense in himself that 
makes him question an activity that is out of 
order in ordinary living. (p. 166)  
 
In Arendt’s (1978) point of view real philosophizing 
which can help us to hear the reverberation of the 
phenomena, requires of the researcher a listening and 
questioning from within his or her own lived 
experiences.  
 
This statement raises even more questions: What is 
meant by listening and questioning? Are we to get 
psychological and conduct introspections? Should the 
philosopher learn to listen more to his or her own 
feelings and bodily emotions in a more psychological 
sense in order to become a good phenomenologist? 
Alternatively, as many phenomenological oriented 
philosophers would claim, is it possible that a 
psychological approach is not required but that a truly 
philosophical approach is needed in order to do 
phenomenological prober? However, as Robert 
Bernasconi (2009) indicates in the journal Research 
in Phenomenology, doing philosophy prober might 
also lead us away from doing phenomenology prober. 
He indicates, that “phenomenology is almost always 
more than philosophy proper, because it exceeds 
philosophy” (p. 2)  
 
This leads to questions regarding how to practice 
phenomenology in a way that exceeds both academic 
philosophy and psychology. In this article I want to 
use the work of Gadamer and Heidegger as well as 
the tradition of philosophy understood as an art and 
way of living (Hadot, Foucault, Achenbach, Lindseth, 
Hansen2) to point to a third position. This position is a 
way of philosophizing in the sense that Arendt (1958, 
1978) calls for, and it is strongly connected to the 
Greek concept of philo-sophia, that is, a longing and 
love for wisdom. I will be led by the interpretations of 
Arendt, Gadamer and other Plato-interpreters 
(Barthold, 2010; Hadot, 1995; Rhodes, 2003; Sayre, 
1995) who argue that the Socratic dialogue and 
                                                 
2 For further information and elaboration of this kind of 
modern philosophical counselling and Socratic dialogue 
groups, the reader is referred to Achenbach (1987, 2010), 
Hansen (2007a, 2007b, 2010), Lahav (1996a, 1996b), 
Lindseth (2005), and Tilmann and Lahav (1995). 
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dialectics and Midwifery are subtle ways of 
deconstructing our common concepts and 
assumptions and daily understanding of our lives in 
order to arrive at an ontological silence and presence 
of who and where we are right now. As Arendt (1978) 
writes:  
 
It is in this [the thinking] invisible element’s 
nature to undo, unfreeze, as it were, what 
language, the medium of thinking, has frozen 
into thought - words (concepts, sentences, 
definitions, doctrines) whose ‘weakness’ and 
inflexibility Plato denounces so splendidly in 
the Seventh Letter. (p. 174) 
 
This existential awakening and coming-to-the-world-
as-if-for-the-first-time is, from the start to the very 
end of the Socratic dialogue and thinking, led and 
nurtured by a fundamental lived experience of wonder 
(Thaumazein), which is not to be confused with a 
conceptual and epistemological puzzlement and 
deadlock (Aporia). Merleau-Ponty (1945/2007) refers 
to this fundamental wonder in the preface to 
Phenomenology of Perception, when he says that “… 
the best formulation of the [phenomenological] 
reduction is probably that given by Eugen Fink, 
Husserl’s assistant, when he spoke of ‘wonder’ in the 
face of the world”(p. xv). 
 
My aim in this article is therefore to examine whether 
we can qualify the discourse among contemporary 
human scientists who talk about the importance of a 
phenomenological openness and attitude in their work 
by focusing on the phenomenon of philosophical 
wonder in phenomenological research. In order to 
achieve this aim I will first focus on the way in which 
the place of philosophizing and wonderment is 
described in contemporary phenomenology in human 
science. In this regard, I discuss two fundamentally 
different ways of approaching phenomenology: (1) A 
scientific and epistemological approach based on the 
work of Giorgi (1985, 1997, 2006) and Dalhberg 
(2006; Dahlberg, Dahlberg, & Nyström, 2008; 
Dahlberg, Todres, & Galvin, 2009); and (2) an 
aesthetical and ontological approach based on the 
work of Todres and Galvin (2008, 2010), Halling 
(2008, 2010, Halling, Kunz, & Rowe, 1994; Halling, 
Leifer, & Rowe, 2006), and Van Manen (1990, 2002, 
2007).  
 
Secondly, I will try to circle in on the possible 
differences between psychological and philosophical 
understandings of what it means to be present and 
open in phenomenological research. I will do this by 
focusing on how we can understand feelings and 
emotions from an ontological approach, especially 
with reference to the work of Heidegger (1919/1999, 
1923/1995, 1927/2010, 1954/2004, 1961, 1971, 1994, 
1995), Martin Buber (1923/2004) and two poets3.  
 
This second point leads me to the important 
difference between ‘emotional homecoming’ and 
‘existential homecoming’ highlighted in a discussion 
with Les Todres and Kathleen Galvin. Todres and 
Galvin (2008) develop an ontological approach to 
phenomenology through their use of Heidegger’s 
notion of Poetic Dwelling. This leads to questions 
regarding the difference between Poetic Dwelling and 
Socratic Wonderment. Through describing some 
essential critiques levelled by Karl Jaspers, Gadamer 
and Arendt regarding Heidegger’s notion of 
Gelassenheit and solitary intuition as a way of direct 
and pure seeing of the phenomena, I will make room 
for an understanding of ‘existential homecoming’ and 
the phenomenological attitude as a part of a Bildung 
process. I will argue that this is a process that is not 
only directed by a Poetic Dwelling but also by a 
Socratic Wonderment, based on what Socrates called 
Ethical Self-Care, which I term articulating ‘a Living 
Poetics’ of the phenomenologist.  
 
My main conclusion will be that in order to bring 
oneself ‘into-the-openness’ and into a dialogue with 
the phenomenon itself the researcher should not only 
be able to hear the Thou in the voices of Life through 
a Poetic Dwelling, but also hear the I, or voice of the 
Living Poetics of the researcher, through a Socratic 
Wonder. I maintain that it is in the dance, or middle 
voice, between the Poetic Dwelling and Socratic 
Wonder that a space, or Lichtung, is opened and a 
wonder-based dialogue and the event of 
understanding can happen to the researcher.  
 
A scientific and epistemological view of 
phenomenology 
 
It is common to draw a distinction between 
descriptive scientific phenomenology, as described by 
Giorgi (1985) or Schutz (1967), where we are both 
allowed and expected to follow some well-defined 
method and procedure, and hermeneutic or existential 
                                                 
3 Psychology can be broadly described as based on 
empirical science and the data that can be captured by these 
methodologies. Through listening to and allowing myself to 
be inspired by artists and poets as a source for subtle 
experiences in understanding wonderment and feelings, I 
follow Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (1989, 2007). 
On the first page of Truth and Method (Gadamer, 
1960/1989) he acknowledges the paramount importance of 
the experience of practicing philosophy, art and story-
telling of human life in order to gain a deeper 
phenomenological and hermeneutic understanding of 
human experiences. These philosophical and aesthetic 
‘truth-experiences’ transcend the data that empirical science 
can collect through its methods and observations and 
descriptions.  
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phenomenology, as described by Van Manen (1990, 
2002, 2007) and the Utrecht School (Kockelmans, 
1987), where we are encouraged to enforce a non-
procedural approach and instead point to an approach 
that is oriented by a special phenomenological 
attitude. Many practicing phenomenologists in the 
fields of education, nursing and qualitative research 
would probably say that they follow both approaches. 
On the one hand they do follow some well-defined 
phenomenological methods such as transcendental 
reduction, imaginative variation, and phenomeno-
logical data analysis. In addition, as professionals in 
the field of nursing, education or other human-
relation professions, they are also aided by other 
human science procedures and techniques such as 
experiential interviewing, observations that are 
experience-sensitive, and thematic and narrative 
analysis. However, on the other hand, they are also 
very aware of the limitations of a too rigid 
methodology when doing phenomenology. If the use 
of methods and techniques is not governed by a 
higher musicality for the ‘subject matter’ (the living 
phenomenon) then the phenomenological researcher 
will become just an ‘epistemological bookkeeper’; 
one who may be an expert in systemizing and 
analysing data but who does not have the necessary 
phenomenological ‘ear’ to hear the phenomenon itself 
(die Sache selbst). In order to get this ‘ear’ or 
musicality for the phenomena it is necessary to learn 
how to do phenomenology with a phenomenological 
attitude and therefore a closer description of what this 
attitude consists of seems paramount for the quality of 
the phenomenological research.  
 
One of the leading figures in descriptive phenomen-
ology, and especially in phenomenological 
psychology, is the psychologist Amedeo Giorgi. He 
writes about the importance of a modified 
phenomenological approach that is freed from 
philosophizing in order for the psychologists and 
other qualitative researchers to do good 
phenomenological research in their own specific 
discipline. Giorgi (1997, 2006) suggests that instead 
of trying to philosophize in order to do good 
phenomenological research, the psychologist or nurse 
should rather adopt his or her disciplinary attitude 
within the context of the phenomenological attitude. 
Giorgi thus suggests, for example, that only if the 
phenomenological psychologist is able to 
psychologize the phenomenological data, will he or 
she have the proper sensitivity to the phenomeno-
logical analysis and be able to provide a perspective 
that enables the data to be manageable in a way that is 
scientifically interesting for the discipline of 
psychology.  
 
Giorgi (1997, 2006), who is primarily inspired by 
Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology, refers to this as 
a necessary turn to a ‘scientific phenomenological 
method’, moving away from the more philosophical 
phenomenological approach. Instead of talking about 
wonder as a leading ethos for the phenomenological 
inquiry and about a fundamental sense of mystery or 
an enigmatic impression to dwell in when trying to 
understand the world, Giorgi would rather encourage 
the researcher to look in a systematic way for 
‘essences’ by identifying general themes in the 
phenomenological description and analysis.  
 
Other theorists, particularly the Swedish Healthcare 
Researcher Karin Dahlberg, follow Husserl and 
Giorgi to some extent. However, Dahlberg also tries 
to supply Husserl’s abstract and theoretical approach 
and Giorgi’s methodological approach with a more 
embodied and relational approach through using the 
work of Merleau-Ponty as inspiration. According to 
Dahlberg, in order to gain a personal authentic contact 
and dialogue with the phenomenon, the phenomeno-
logical researcher must practice open-mindedness and 
be very attentive and bodily present. This involves 
adopting a listening mood led by curiosity, stillness, 
slowness and a kind of ‘actively waiting’ or ‘bridling’ 
(Dahlberg et al., 2008). These ways of being assist the 
researcher in becoming bodily attuned with the 
phenomenon and the way the researcher is ‘in-the-
world’.  
 
Dahlberg et al. (2008) write of the importance of a 
particular openness derived from the capacity of 
being curious and surprised, which is an attitude the 
phenomenological researcher must train him- or 
herself to have. Dahlberg and her colleagues in the 
book Reflective Lifeworld Research (2008) give a rich 
description of different forms of openness that the 
phenomenological researcher must learn to cultivate 
and adapt. They describe this special kind of openness 
with references to Heidegger, Gadamer and other 
hermeneutists and phenomenologists as well as 
cognitive and social psychologists. However, what 
springs to mind when reading their interpretation of 
Heidegger’s view on openness is their confusion of 
his ontological understanding of openness with the 
phenomenon of surprise and curiosity. “For 
researchers, openness means having the capacity to be 
surprised and sensitive to the unpredicted and 
unexpected. Heidegger (1998 – [Sein und Zeit, 1927]) 
describes an open position as ‘curiosity’ (p. 214) and 
talks of a ‘desire’ to see, to understand (p. 215)” 
(Dahlberg et al., 2008, p. 98).  
 
In contrast, my reading of Heidegger’s (1927/2010) 
thoughts on curiosity in Sein und Zeit highlights that 
the whole point of his description of the 
phenomenology of curiosity is to show how curiosity 
closes our ontological openness towards the world 
and ourselves. In fact, in Heidegger’s eyes curiosity 
(which St. Augustine already noted in the early 
Middle Age) is an expression of a forgetfulness of 
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Being, and a lack of ability or readiness to stand still 
in the near of the phenomenon. In Being and Time he 
writes, “In not-staying, curiosity makes sure of the 
constant possibility of distraction. Curiosity has 
nothing to do with the contemplation that wonders at 
being, thaumazein, it has no interest in wondering to 
the point of not understanding” (Heidegger, 
1927/2010, p. 166).  
 
To be curious and to be in wonderment is thus 
fundamentally not the same, if we are to follow 
Heidegger. Intellectual curiosity and the openness and 
interested attitude that flow from that source are of 
course paramount for good scientific work, and in that 
sense positive phenomenon. However, to ‘think’ in a 
deeper, more phenomenological and hermeneutical 
sense is, as we know from Heidegger and Gadamer 
(and also Wittgenstein), not the same as doing 
systematic and scientific reflection. In this regard, 
Wittgenstein (1980) writes, “Man has to awaken to 
wonder – and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way 
of sending him to sleep again” (p. 5; see also Bearn, 
1997; Cahill, 2011). In the same vein, Heidegger 
states, “And since science does not think, thinking 
must in its present situation give to the science that 
searching attention which they are incapable of giving 
to themselves”(Heidegger, 1954/2004, p. 135) . 
 
Scientific reflection led only by intellectual curiosity 
and surprise and interest is, in the eyes of Heidegger, 
Gadamer and Wittgenstein, keeping us away from 
obtaining a thinking and deeper wonder and 
connectedness with our ‘being-in-the-world’ or our 
experience of seeing the world as a fundamental 
mystery. In Heidegger’s terms, curiosity and surprise 
will only create a fixation of our worldview 
(metaphysics and onto-theology) on an epistemo-
logical and technological level (the ‘ontic level’). 
Stated briefly, curiosity is a notion that Heidegger 
considers from the point of view of everydayness 
(inauthenticity).  
 
Reading further in Dahlberg et al. (2008) in order to 
better understand their view of phenomenological 
openness, the reader will find at the end of the chapter 
on openness a reference to a particular critical and 
distancing self-reflection associated with the work of 
Paul Ricoeur. “To think critically about one’s 
approach and methods means that one’s thought 
processes, understanding, and knowledge are 
systematically and impartially scrutinized for 
influence on the research process and the outcome of 
the study”(Dahlberg et al., 2008, p. 144). Everyone 
agrees that healthcare scientists and phenomeno-
logical and hermeneutic researchers must also have a 
trained eye and skills for this form of impartial critical 
self-reflection. However, what distinguishes an 
existential phenomenologist and a philosophical 
hermeneutics from an empirical scientist and a 
descriptive phenomenologist (and maybe also from 
critical hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of 
suspicion4, with which Ricoeur associates himself) is 
his or her sensitivity and attentiveness to that which 
the critical self-reflection and the scientific systematic 
and analytical and methodological approach cannot 
grasp. This is the ontological level – the Being-
dimension. 
  
In order to attune oneself to this dimension, the 
researcher has to think from an ontological (‘living 
understanding’, Risser, 2012) and existential 
approach. In this approach, the researcher ‘sees’ or 
‘hears’ the phenomenon through an existential 
participation through being grasped by the 
phenomenon. Unlike Ricoeur’s approach, Gadamer’s 
and Heidegger’s approaches are not epistemological. 
In contrast to Ricoeur, Gadamer talks about Theoria 
in the Greek sense in opposition to the modern 
scientific sense of the concept of theory. For 
Gadamer, Theoria is a kind of contemplation or 
meditation, during which the thinking person 
becomes, so to speak, a part of the phenomenon while 
thinking. He thinks the phenomenon while being in 
the phenomenon.  
 
This raises more questions regarding the type of 
openness referred to by Dahlberg et al. (2008). 
Perhaps it is an openness determined and limited by 
an epistemological approach and critical reflection, or 
by an ontological approach and existential reflection. 
There seems to be, at least in my view, some 
incoherence in their view of phenomenological 
openness and their use of different philosophers. This 
incoherence hides some very important differences 
between the phenomenology of curiosity and wonder, 
and the attitude of critical self-reflection on the one 
hand and existential self-reflection and ontological 
contemplation on the other hand. In my opinion what 
Dahlberg et al. lack in their ‘reflective lifeworld 
research’ is a richer and more nuanced language for 
this ontological dimension and especially a sense of 
why wonder is connected to a fundamental sense of 
the mystery and enigmatic nature of our existence. 
This lack seems to be exposed when, for example, 
                                                 
4 This is not the place to discuss the subtle and fine 
differences between Gadamer’s and Ricouer’s approaches 
and thinking in order to tune in to the essence of the subject 
matter and Being-dimension. It is also not the place to 
debate whether there is an important difference between 
Ricoeur’s impartial and systematic critical reflection (what 
is called epistemological hermeneutics) and the 
contemplative and involving thinking as an ontological 
event that happens to us (which is called ontological 
hermeneutics, or ‘living ontology’, Risser, 1997) that 
Gadamer talks about through Socratic dialogue and 
dialectics. The point I want to make here is that these 
important differences in reflection (and views on openness) 
are covered up and not mentioned in Dahlberg et al. (2008).  
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Dahlberg (2006) writes, “Following Husserl, it must 
be stressed that grasping essences is by no means 
something mysterious or enigmatic” (p. 11)5 
However, when following Heidegger and Gadamer as 
they also do, trying to grasp the essence of a 
phenomena is indeed an enigmatic and mysterious 
endeavour that is expressed by our being taken by 
wonder.  
 
An aesthetic and ontological view of 
phenomenology 
 
Two British phenomenological researchers from the 
Centre for Qualitative Research at Bournemouth 
University, Les Todres and Kathleen Galvin, have, in 
what I would describe as a much stronger and clearer 
announcement, expressed their main interest in 
placing phenomenological research on a firm 
existential and ontological ground. Although Todres 
and Galvin write about embodied and relational-
centred interpretation in a language that is very much 
turned towards the psychological viewpoint of the 
heath-care professional and although in some of their 
texts (Todres, 2008, Todres & Galvin, 2008) they 
seem to follow an American philosopher and 
psychotherapist, Eugene Gendlin, and his 
‘psychologized philosophy’, they nevertheless seem 
in some ways to overcome and transcend this 
psychological language and therapeutic attitude in 
their later thinking.  
 
Guided by Mugerauer (2008), a Heidegger scholar 
and philosopher, and inspired by Heidegger’s own 
thinking on ‘existential homecoming’ and the notion 
of Gelassenheit, Todres and Galvin follow the path 
Heidegger took in his later thinking, turning towards 
poetry and a special form of ‘poeticised 
philosophizing’ (Heidegger, 1971). In so doing, they 
seem to point towards some very interesting 
applications and concepts for such a poetized 
philosophizing in qualitative research. Terms such as 
‘poetic enquiry’, ‘aesthetic phenomenology’ and an 
‘existential theory of well-being’ (Todres & Galvin, 
2010) can be seen as words to a new vocabulary that 
might be helpful in the development of 
phenomenology in the future. By taking this path, 
phenomenology is tuned to a less epistemological and 
scientific and psychologically-oriented vocabulary 
                                                 
5 To be fair, it is important to note that Dahlberg in her later 
thinking (see for example Dahlberg et al., 2009), circles 
around another way of describing ‘bridling’ and the 
‘phenomenological attitude’ with the help of the thinking of 
the later Heidegger. However, this does not yet seem to 
have moved her from her basically Husserlian and more 
epistemological approach to phenomenology.  
when doing phenomenology and describing the 
practice6 of phenomenology. 
 
However, I also think that there are still some further 
steps that must be taken if we really want to go all the 
way into an ‘ontologization’ (Gonzalez, 2009), or a 
‘living understanding’ (Risser, 2012) of phenomen-
ology as a ‘homecoming’. These steps, I argue, have 
to do with the nature of Poetic Dwelling and Socratic 
wonder. What is missing from Todres and Galvin’s 
approach is the Socratic approach as well as an even 
more ontologically-oriented approach to what Poetic 
Dwelling might be.7  
 
In their 2008 article, Todres and Galvin were very 
influenced by Gendlin and his description of ‘felt 
meaning’ and embodied interpretation, which Todres 
and Galvin (2008) describe as “emotional 
homecoming” (p. 569). When talking about Poetic 
Dwelling they emphasise the need for the 
phenomenologist to experience ‘the feel of language’, 
the evocative dimension, in order to tune in to and ‘be 
with that’ (Todres, 2008). This is the lived 
experience, which speaks to us and which makes an 
                                                 
6 I am aware that Todres and Galvin (2008) do not propose 
that poetic dwelling or ‘poetic presence’ is what they start 
out with when doing phenomenological research. In their 
2008 article they only bring ‘embodied interpretation’ (and 
its poetic sensibility) into play at the findings stage as a way 
of re-presenting findings in communicative, robust and 
evocative ways. However, I think that one could and should 
go a step further (like is done in Art-Based Research and in 
the tradition of Research by Design) and say that 
phenomenology should also start (and be led and end) by an 
aesthetical attunement towards what is essential and calling 
to us in our meeting with the phenomenon. This embodied 
and aesthetical ‘musicality’ should not only be seen as a 
communicative means or vehicle for the scientific finding 
of the phenomenological researcher, but also as a way of 
being and listening which directs and leads the researcher to 
her or his findings.  
7 I am also aware that the two articles I discuss (Todres & 
Galvin, 2008, 2010) were approaching two different 
projects: The former pursued a psychological research 
methodology project that wished to communicate findings 
in evocative ways, while the second article was pursuing a 
more ontological project about the art of living. Thus, the 
articles relate to different kinds and levels of 
phenomenologically-oriented projects and the fact that 
phenomenology includes different kinds and levels of 
projects needs to be made explicit (e.g. The art of living, 
articulating human phenomena through research, psycho-
therapeutic change, etc.). However, I think that leaving out 
the ontological attunement to the phenomenon (through 
Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder) and the ontological-
based critique (cf. Gadamer’s critique of scientific 
methodology) of psychological research methodology (as 
Todres and Galvin do in their 2008 article) may too easily 
cover up important ‘ontological ciphers’ in the lived 
experience so that we only see ‘the empirical’ (cf. Merleau-
Ponty, 1964). 
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impression on us and which has also shown us that 
we will always be lacking in words to express this 
lived experience. Todres and Galvin (2008) have an 
essential but, in my eyes, also a peculiar formulation 
when they write:   
 
We would like to emphasize that words, which 
connect the personal to the interpersonal 
world, are humanizing in that they can find the 
“I” in the “Thou” in Buber’s sense (Buber, 
1970). This is assisted by the kind of language 
that is evocative and poetic and seeks to make 
things come alive. We seek to find a way of 
using language so that readers of phenomeno-
logical descriptions can find personal meaning 
in the descriptions, and thus find themselves in 
the language in some way. (p. 570)  
   
The first question that must be answered concerns 
whether it would be more precise – in the spirit of 
Martin Buber – to say that the readers should not find 
their ‘I’ in the ‘Thou’, but rather that they should try 
to find their ‘I’ in relation to the ‘Thou’ or, even 
better, find themselves in the relation between the ‘I’ 
and the ‘Thou’. In Buber’s I-Thou-philosophy, the ‘I’ 
is seen to be as mysterious and metaphysical8 as the 
‘Thou’, and I and Thou should not be confused and 
seen as identical. The ‘I’ should also not be confused 
with the person’s ego or idiosyncratic feelings and 
thoughts. In contrast, the ‘I’ in Buber’s understanding 
is described as ‘the person’, and is as enigmatic and 
mysterious as the ‘Thou’. Buber also underlines that 
“the word “I” is the true Shibboleth of humanity. 
Listen to it!” (Buber, 1923/2004, p. 115). He further 
emphases that Socrates was the one who called this 
‘I’ to vividly emerge in dialogues with and in the 
presence of other human beings. It is in the tension 
that exists in-between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’, that the human 
being may find and try to understand himself.  
 
In other words, the voice of Thou (or the voice of 
Life/Being or Sein as Heidegger would say in his later 
thinking9) is not the same as the voice of the self (or 
                                                 
8 Note that when using the word ‘meta-physical’ Buber 
does not connect to the ‘metaphysics of presence’ and the 
‘myth of the given’ that dominated Western philosophy and 
were gradually used by Hume and Kant but especially by 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Derrida. It is still 
possible to speak of ‘metaphysical experiences’ in a post-
metaphysical and post-modern age. The later works of 
Heidegger as well as the work of Gadamer, Arendt and 
Buber can be said to think, although in different ways, from 
this kind of ‘negative ontology’.  
9 In Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (Heidegger, 
1994) we find a special interest in focusing on das Zwischen 
or ‘the between’ that both binds together and distance Sein 
and Dasein, the two poles in the movement that Heidegger 
calls Ereignis or ‘the event’. See also Kirkland (2007) for 
the description of how one could understand thinking in this 
Dasein, in Heidegger’s words). Both agencies are 
bonded to the ontological (or, as Buber would say, 
‘meta-physical and meta-psychic’) dimension. In 
contrast, the ‘little Ego’ (also known as our daily 
idiosyncratic identity and voice) is bonded to the 
psychological and socio-cultural sediments of time 
and culture. This is what Heidegger would call the 
‘ontic’ level and Buber the level of ‘It’.  
 
In their work, Todres and Galvin set up a dichotomy 
between, on the one hand, ‘just logical understanding’ 
and, on the other hand, an emotional and poetic 
understanding that can connect people in a heartfelt 
way. They maintain that through focusing on bodily 
sensed understanding we will be led to a region that 
cannot be reached through the language of logical 
rigorous, precise and rational words. However, I want 
to question whether, by only focusing on this kind of 
bodily sensed understanding and emotional home-
coming, we are only going half the way or, maybe 
even worse, we risk getting lost in psycho-logical and 
psycho-centric worldviews. Perhaps we are not going 
far enough when we say, as Todres and Galvin do, 
that we should try to find ourselves in the language. 
Perhaps it would be more precise to say that we 
should try to find ourselves in what language can only 
indirectly point at. Perhaps we should find ourselves 
in that which is not to be found in language but rather 
in the relation or triad between ‘I’, language and 
‘Thou’ and unfold through action, wonder, presence 
and love10.  
 
Poets as guides to the Mountains of the Heart 
 
It is possible that feelings, emotions and bodily 
sensed perceptions and understandings are only side 
effects or powerless ontic labels and vehicles of 
deeper ontological dynamics and meta-physical 
moods and phenomena, which at the end of the day 
we only can experience honestly and most directly as 
a mystery and through the experience of being in a 
fundamental wonderment. If we follow the quotation 
of Buber (1923/2004) at the very beginning of this 
article, it appears possible that love, as a meta-physic 
and metaphysical event, can only be experienced 
through a wondrous mind. I believe that Todres and 
Galvin would agree with this, and would say that 
Poetic Inquiry and Dwelling is about finding words 
and metaphors and aesthetic expressions that can help 
                                                                          
between, and why Socratic maieutic and dialectical and 
elenctic methods exhibit something like the same dynamic.  
10 I am not here following the example of Arendt, Jaspers 
and Gadamer in relation to being influenced by St. 
Augustine’s notion of love. However, later in this article I 
will discuss the connection between wonder and love which 
Augustine points to, and which I also see in Buber’s 
description of love as not a feeling but as a meta-psychic 
and meta-physical event.   
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us in seeing and experiencing the wonder and mystery 
of everyday life and thereby placing us in an 
ontological relation with the world. The question then 
becomes one of how we can listen to and stay in the 
world in an ontological way if emotions, feelings and 
bodily sensed understandings can in some situations 
and ways stand in our way of stepping further on into 
a more meta-physical and meta-psychic listening and 
being-in-the-world; what Heidegger would call 
Befindlichkeit and Gelassenheit. 
 
Let us, for a moment, become quiet and just listen to 
the voices of two poets who have been in the 
experiential landscape of creation and wonder. One of 
these poets is internationally known (Rainer Marie 
Rilke), and the second is a distinguished Danish poet 
(Paul la Cour). 
 
Exposed on the mountains of the heart 
 
Cast out, exposed on the mountains of the 
heart. Look,  
how small there, 
look: the last village of words, and higher, 
yet how small it is too, one final 
farmstead of feeling. Do you see it? 
Cast out, exposed on the mountains of the 
heart. Hard rock 
Under my hands. Here, true, something 
Comes into flower; from the mute rock-face 
An unknowing weed puts out its flowers, 
singing. 
But the man, knowing? Ah, who began to 
know, 
Cast out, silent now, on the mountains of the 
heart. 
True, safe in unclouded awareness, 
Many a mountain creature travels about, 
Changes and lingers. And the great sheltered 
bird 
Circles the pure rejection of peaks. –But 
Unsheltered here on the mountains of the 
heart… 
(Rilke, 1914/2011, p. 19) 
 
For they are the moments when something 
new has entered us, something unknown; our 
feelings grow mute in shy embarrassment, 
everything in us withdraws, a silence arises, 
and the new experience, which no one knows, 
stands in the midst of it all and says nothing. 
(Rilke, 2000, p. 74).  
 
One says about the Poet that he is a Word 
Artist, equipped with a special Word 
Imagination, and sees in that the original 
Testimony about his Destiny. But this is a 
Result of his Destiny. It was the Tool he 
formed in order to be able to transform his 
Wonder in visible Signs. The Language was 
later. Prior to that was the heaven-fallen 
Wonder, first the Force of Expression, which 
created the Language.  
(La Cour, 1948, p. 73, my translation) 
 
There exist sybilian lines of verses of such a 
shining Beauty,  
that they move you by their Radiance and 
Music. No one would  
consider asking, what they mean in tangible 
sense; the miraculous in  
them is Meaning enough. They melt you into 
deep Life Experience  
only by being there. Don’t forget that the 
enigmatic has its Clarity. The  
Mystery lights up.  
(La Cour, 1948, p. 104, my translation) 
 
When a great Movement from outside catches 
you, and the Poem awakens and becomes alive 
in you, do not think then that your Role only is 
to transmit it further on. It must meet a 
Movement from you at the Bottom of your 
Being, older than itself. You must penetrate it 
with your own primordial movement of the 
mind [or soul] and fight with it in order to 
force it to become Signs. Without you meeting 
it with something, that was as unbent as itself, 
it decays through you to Sentimentality.  
(La Cour, 1948, p. 75, my translation) 
 
In climbing the mountains of the heart in Rilke’s 
(1914) poem, notice how we first pass “the last 
hamlet of words”, which from the position where we 
look down now looks so small and inadequate. 
However, we should also notice that the spiritual 
climber has also passed another place, which, from 
where he is now located, looks equally small. This 
second place is called “a last homestead of feeling”. 
The climber has moved to a higher level, a level that 
feelings seem too small and deaf to grasp, although 
we are getting nearer to the summit of the mountains 
of the heart. This raises the question: If feelings can 
lead us astray from the insights of the heart what then 
does the spiritual climber see and how does he see? 
According to the poem, he sees an unknowing 
flowering herb which sings its way to life and a great 
protected bird that circles around the peaks. The 
wanderer, who now understands, then becomes silent, 
exposed and unprotected as he is on the mountains of 
the heart. It is possible to understand this unprotected 
and silent wandering as a kind of fundamental 
wonderment. This may be why St. Augustine once 
wrote11: “‘Percutit cor meum sine laesione’ – It 
                                                 
11 The quotation and translation of this sentence from St. 
Augustine’s Confessions is borrowed from Verhoeven 
(1972, p. 40). This quotation is open to discussion, as the 
156 
This volume page number is not for bibliographic reference purposes
[Wonder] strikes the Heart without hurting it” 
(Verhoeven, 1972, p. 40).  
 
In Rilke’s (2000) next reflection, which consists of 
Poetics on how to become a poet, he advises the 
young poet to move at a very slow and attentive pace, 
not listening only to his feelings but also to that which 
seems to transcend what can be captured both in 
words and feelings. He states that when meeting ‘that’ 
“our feelings grow mute in shy embarrassment” 
(Rilke, 2000, p. 74). In this silence, which arises both 
on the cognitive and emotional levels, the new and 
unknown appears. The question then becomes: How 
do we move into this heartfelt silence and be a living 
part of it? In another famous letter from the same 
book, Letter #4 dated 16 July 1903, Rilke (2000, p. 
35) writes:  
 
Be patient toward all that is unsolved in your 
heart and try to love the questions themselves, 
like locked rooms and like books that are now 
written in a very foreign tongue. Do not now 
seek the answers, which cannot be given you 
because you would not be able to live them. 
And the point is, to live everything. Live the 
questions now. Perhaps you will then 
gradually, without noticing it, live along some 
distant day into the answer. 
 
Thus, living the question and not hastening toward an 
answer appears to be a way to stay with “the moments 
when something new has entered us, something 
unknown” (Rilke, 2000, p. 74). Once again, this leads 
to yet more questions: How do we live the question? 
What kind of relation to the world and ourselves do 
we found ourselves in within those moments? How 
can we ‘be with that’ if we are not to follow our 
logical and emotional understanding, but to instead 
follow (to use Buber’s words) a meta-physical and 
meta-psychic understanding where we live our 
questions?  
 
In his poetics, the Danish poet Paul la Cour (1948) 
states that a poet is not just a man who has a special 
talent and competence for creating and mastering 
                                                                          
full sentence is: ”Quid est illud, quod interlucet mihi et 
percutit cor meum sine laesione?”, which Nolan (1990, p. 
77) translates as ”What is it that shines into me and pierces 
my heart without wounding?” This raises questions 
regarding what it is that strikes the heart. Is it wonder, 
wisdom or an experience of looking at God through glass 
darkly, as St. Paul writes in 1. Corinthias, 13.12: ”Videmus 
nunc per speculum in aenigmate”?, which can be translated 
as ”Now we see through reflections from the enigmatic”. I 
tend to share Verhoeven’s (1972) view that it is in the 
enigmatic light from life, when we are in a deep wonder, 
that our hearts are struck but not wounded. I also believe 
that there is wisdom to be gain in these reflections from the 
enigmatic. 
words in imaginary ways. Instead, a poet is forced by 
his destiny to do so, because he is driven by a deeper 
longing or calling or force (a vocation in life) that is 
expressed through a fundamental wonder. Only if he 
is bonded to and writes (or sings) from this 
fundamental wonder will his talent and tools for 
creating words find meaning. La Cour (1948) writes, 
“Prior to that [language] was the heaven-fallen 
Wonder, first the Force of Expression, which created 
the Language” (p. 73). Thus wonder, it seems, comes 
before language.  
 
In his second reflection, or rather observation from 
his practice of creating, La Cour (1948) points to the 
fact and experience, that poetic lines and poetic 
dwelling can be of such beautiful and breathtaking 
nature, that they are able to “…melt you into deep 
Life Experience only by being there” (p. 104). Thus, 
like Rilke (1914/2011, 2000), La Cour (1948) advises 
us to stay there, doing nothing but living in this poem 
or line and in the fundamental sense of wonder that 
this poem or line may evoke in us.  
 
On the other hand, if we hasten to find a logical or 
emotional understanding of this poem we will not be 
open to the silent wisdom of the enigmatic and 
mysterious. “Don’t forget that the enigmatic has its 
Clarity. The Mystery lights up” (La Cour, 1948, p. 
104). Thus being in wonder makes us see what cannot 
be seen directly through cognitions and emotion. Yet 
the road to this insight might have been through 
cognitions and emotions. 
 
In his last observation La Cour (1948) brings in an 
important distinction between the Voices of Life and 
the Voice of the poet’s own Being. Based on Plato’s 
description of the poets (Ion, Menon, Phaedrus, 
Symposium, The Laws) we imagine persons who are 
in a way ‘out of themselves’, taken by a divine 
madness in order to be a medium for the voices of the 
gods. However, like Martin Buber, the Danish poet 
wants us to reflect not just on the voices of the 
‘Thou’, but also on the voices of the ‘I’, which is an 
equally mysterious and metaphysical agency (who 
and where am I in relation to the Voices of the 
Other?) and “the true Shibboleth of humanity” (Buber, 
1923/2004, p. 115).  
 
According to La Cour (1948), we end up getting stuck 
in sentimental feelings if the poem is not created in 
the space between the Voice of the Subject Matter or 
the call of the phenomenon on the one hand, and the 
voice of the Person on the other hand, who responds 
to this calling in what he or she experiences as the 
most honest and authentic way of responding. La 
Cour (1948) writes, “You must penetrate it with your 
own primordial movement of the mind [or soul] and 
fight with it in order to force it to become Signs” 
(p.75).  
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The use of poems and literature as valid signposts or 
guideposts and as a kind of ‘metaphysical and meta-
psychic factum’ and ‘ontological evidence’ for 
investigating a life phenomenon is well-known 
among philosophical hermeneutists and phenomen-
ologists. According to Van den Berg (1955), “poets 
and artists are born phenomenologists” (p. 61, cited in 
Bachelard, 1994, p. 1994, p. xxviii.). In other words, 
phenomenologists express themselves with a poetic 
precision that is more accurate and in tune with what 
Merleau-Ponty (1964, 1968, 1945/2007) called ‘the 
ontological cipher’ in the lived experience than what 
could be obtained through any empirical investigation 
and logical and proportional precision.  
 
However, a change in tone and way of speaking can 
be noted when Rilke (1914/2011, 2000) and La Cour 
(1948) reflect upon their own creative and poetic 
process and what constitutes a poem. In this moment, 
they move from being poets to becoming thinkers. In 
their poetics, which should not be confused with ‘the 
theory of poetry’ that can only be written by 
academics with a mere scholarly interest in poetry, we 
experience a ‘living poetics’, which is a reflection and 
wonderment from within the lived experience of 
being a poet. This living poetics is remarkable 
because it can only be experienced by poets. They 
dwell in the lived experience of doing poesy (the 
phenomenological momentum) and from there they 
reflect, wonder and think about the essence and 
fundamental meaning and value of doing poesy. They 
become philosophers who seek the universal in the 
concrete with a sharp ear for that which cannot be 
expressed in clear thoughts directly (the hermeneutic 
momentum).  
 
This leads me to question why these poets do not 
simply stick to their poetical language. Why do they 
need to philosophize at all? I imagine that it is 
because they experience a kind of embarrassment or 
inadequacy when they, to use non-poetic words, want 
to understand themselves and communicate what is 
really going on and what matters in good poetry. It 
seems that they want, so to speak, to find themselves 
and give a personal response to the call of poetry, 
which seems to have become their passion and 
destiny. They might struggle with questions such as: 
What is really the meaning of poetry? What is poetry 
- not just for me but as such? Will poetry make people 
and life better in an ethical sense? What is beauty and 
truth? Where does the mattering arise from? What is 
calling on me? What is my Call as a poet and as the 
person I am? What is the relation between me, the 
language and ‘that’, which wants to be expressed?  
 
Those are all fundamentally philosophical questions, 
which lead the poet to philosophize ‘from within’ 
when he or she writes his or her poetics. It seems that 
this deep longing to understand through thinking from 
and over the practice of doing poesy is something that 
only the practice of philosophizing can offer. 
However, this can only be done in co-operation or 
with inspiration from poesy. Thus, as the Danish 
Philosopher K. E. Løgstrup (1957) writes, 
“Philosophy can – at best – make an understanding 
clear. Poetry can make it present” (p. 226, my 
translation). 
  
Existential well-being? To find an idea I can live 
and die for 
 
In an article from 2010 Todres and Galvin write of an 
existential homecoming, which is apparently different 
to the ‘emotional homecoming’ they write about in 
their 2008 article. Their ‘lead singer’ is now no longer 
Eugene Gendlin but Heidegger. In the 2012 article 
they investigate the concept and experience of 
Heidegger’s Gelassenheit, and describe it as a kind of 
‘peaceful attunement to existence’ and a ‘letting-be-
ness’. In this way of being an openness emerges; “an 
openness to allow whatever is there to simply be 
present in the manner that it is present” (Todres & 
Galvin, 2010, p. 4). They write that it is possible to 
come to this kind of ‘letting-be’ and ‘letting-come’ in 
many ways. “One can come to dwelling in many 
ways such as sadness, suffering, concern, 
attentiveness, acceptance, relaxation or patience … to 
dwell is to ‘come home’ to what is there with oneself 
and the world, whatever the qualities of that may 
be”(Todres & Galvin, 2010. p. 4).  
 
Although they do not mention poesy and the aesthetic 
approach in this article, we know from their other 
writings that Poetic Dwelling and Inquiry is also a 
way, in their understanding, to experience 
Gelassenheit, or what Gadamer describe as a “hold 
upon nearness” (Gadamer, 1986a, p. 113). However, 
their statement that Gelassenheit has something to do 
with finding ‘peace’ might not be quite accurate. 
According to Heidegger Gelassenheit refers to 
openness to the mystery, which has little to do with 
peace. Poetic dwelling is a way to Gelassenheit, but it 
may also be an expression of Gelassenheit. For 
Heidegger, Poetic Dwelling has something to do with 
the unfamiliar in the familiar, which might or might 
not lead to a feeling of peace.  
 
Todres and Galvin (2010) also write that the essence 
of dwelling lies in all the ways that we existentially 
‘come home’ to that which we have been given in 
time (temporality), space (spatiality), other (inter-
subjectivity), mood (Befindlichkeit) and bodies 
(embodiment). In other words, if you can navigate and 
take orientation from these existentiale and ways of 
being, then you will be able to help people live a life 
that points towards what Todres and Galvin (2010) 
call ‘existential well-being’.  
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However, when I read this formulation by Todres and 
Galvin (2010) I miss two important things, which I 
am sure would also be remarked on by Heidegger as 
well as other existence-oriented philosophers such as 
Arendt, Gadamer, Buber, Karl Jaspers and Gabriel 
Marcel. These two questions are: (1) Where is the 
experience of fundamental wonder in the description 
of existential dwelling and homecoming? (2) Where 
is the existentiale, which Heidegger (1927/2010) 
named ‘understanding’ or potentiality-for-Being 
(section 31-34), which is not to be confused with 
Befindlichkeit? 
 
Being in wonder is of course not the same as 
experiences of sadness, suffering, concern, 
attentiveness, acceptance, relaxation or patience. The 
experience of fundamental wonder is also not then the 
same as emphatic attentiveness or intellectual 
curiosity, surprise or the experience of deep interest. 
Even when we are curious, surprised or interested we 
remain in the control of our intentionality and on firm 
epistemological ground. We know what we know, 
and expect to know, and want to know, although we 
might be surprised and lose our footing for a moment. 
However, in wonder we do not know and have no 
expectation or specific want to know something. In 
wonder, we find, so to speak, a footing and joy and 
beauty (Arendt, 1978) right in the midst of not-
knowing. It is neither our knowing nor our 
intentionality that direct our awareness, but rather 
Being itself. We have left the epistemological ground 
for a deeper ontological ground, which we trust 
without knowing why. If we must talk about a kind of 
knowing or certainty when we are in wonder, we 
could say that, using Scharmer’s (2007) concepts of 
‘not-yet-embodied knowledge’ and ‘self-transcending 
knowledge’, we have become part of and are 
participating in when being taken by wonder.  
 
On an ontological level, the wonder-experience can 
therefore also be a ‘homecoming’. To further press 
the point, I would argue that it can even be described 
as a deeper level than the experience and feeling of 
sadness, suffering, concern, attentiveness, acceptance, 
relaxation, patience, curiosity, surprise and deep 
interest.12 When Fink (1981) talks about ‘wonder in 
the face of the world’ he tells us that we are placed in 
a ‘not-expecting-to-know’ attitude. This is a kind of 
break-down of our certainties (cognitive as well as 
emotional). Yet, at the same time we may – and this is 
indeed enigmatic and marvellous – experience 
ourselves as being at home in and with the world. “In 
turning towards the existent with wonderment, man is 
as it were primevally open to the world once again, he 
                                                 
12 For a further development of this thought I can refer to 
Heidegger’s distinctions between three fundamental levels 
of feeling, emotions and Grundstimmung (Heidegger, 
1923/1995; Ratcliffe, 2010)  
finds himself in the dawn of a new day of the world in 
which he himself and everything that is begins to 
appear in a new light. The whole of the existent 
dawns upon him anew” (Fink, 1981, p. 24). 
According to Fink (1981) in wonder we ‘visit the 
ground of things’ and are positioned in an original 
relation to the world.  
 
Poetic Dwelling and Socratic Wonder are two 
different ways of becoming in tune and in dialogue 
with the ontological mood (Grundstimmung) that 
silently exist as the tacit backdrop of our existence. 
Poetic Dwelling can help us to be near and present 
and poetize from this ontological mood (being-there), 
while Socratic Wonder can help us to get into a 
thinking and an understanding ‘I-Thou’ relation to 
this ontological mood. Socratic Wonder achieves this 
especially by emphasizing the attunement towards the 
‘I’, that is, the personal response to the call of the 
‘Thou’. (Thus, once again asking the question: Who 
and where am ‘I’ in relation to the ‘Thou’?)   
 
I therefore suggest that Todres and Galvin’s (2010) 
description of existential well-being may need an 
important addition if the existential understanding is 
to be accounted for in their thinking. In my view, 
existential well-being has to do with what Socrates 
called ‘ethical self-care’. It is concerned with what it 
is to live a life with a high level of meaning (a 
coherent life) and with a worldview that is also 
connected to the life experience of what matters in 
life. I thus claim that Socratic reflections about what a 
good, beautiful and wise life consists of are (not just 
for me or my group, but for everyone) very important 
when describing what constitutes the quality of 
existential well-being. We could even perhaps go so 
far as to say that philosophical ideas and 
understandings and longings can be constitutive of the 
person’s fundamental mood (Grundstimmung). For 
instance, when Kierkegaard (1835/2000) writes, “The 
crucial thing is to find a truth which is truth for me, to 
find the idea for which I am willing to live and die” 
(p. 24), he is expressing a fundamental existential 
longing and search that drives every human being. 
Although Kierkegaard (1835/2000) does not speak 
here of self-knowledge but of an idea for which to 
live, he nevertheless further on clarifies that finding 
the idea is to “find myself” (p. 35). He is not seeking 
an abstraction or having only an intellectual and 
cognitive reflection detached from his concrete life 
and embodied experience of life. He is seeking a 
meaningful mode of existence within which he will 
find or become himself (Sagi, 1994). To find an idea 
that one is willing to live and die for is therefore 
closely related to self-understanding. Heidegger and 
Gadamer later follow Kierkegaard’s line of thought 
when they talk about understanding as existential self-
understanding. However, they also emphasize that 
this understanding is rather to be understood as a 
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horizon or world-openness, or experience of 
wholeness, which the person can feel more or less a 
part of, and be called towards.  
 
This leads to the following question: Why not also 
talk about the importance of homecoming in an idea 
of the good life? This idea should not be understood 
as an intellectual, abstract and cognitive idea but 
rather as an inner vision that we try to follow, as a 
painter tries to follow and express an impression. The 
existential idea is to be understood as an attempt to 
connect to the mystery, that there can be meaningful 
mattering at all, that things matters, and behold this 
‘meta-psychic and meta-physical’ factum in silent 
awe and wonder. Maybe it would be better to call it 
an Existential Call, a Will to Meaning that drives us 
(Frankl, 1946/2006) or a fundamental longing; 
although this longing will be manifested through 
different sketches for a ‘ideational landscape’ in 
which to feel at home. This should not be understood 
as sketches that consist of cognitive decisions and 
rationally conceived ‘life philosophies’. Instead, it 
should be understood as our ‘lived understanding’ and 
‘lived philosophy’ of our daily lives, or even better as 
a ‘living poetics’ by which we give a personal 
response to a call.  
 
Merleau-Ponty (1968) provides us with an idea of 
how we should think and move around if we want to 
gain a greater sense of the living understanding and 
philosophy in our lives. He writes: 
 
… the words most charged with philosophy are 
not necessarily those which contain what they 
say, but rather those that most energetically 
open upon Being, because they more closely 
convey the life of the whole and make our 
habitual evidences vibrate until they disjoin. 
Hence it is a question whether philosophy as 
reconquest of brute or wild being can be 
accomplished by the resources of the eloquent 
language, or whether it would not be necessary 
for philosophy to use language in a way that 
takes from it its power of immediate or direct 
signification in order to equal it with what it 
wishes all the same to say. (p. 102-103)  
 
Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty (1968) the words 
most laden with philosophy are the ones that point 
beyond language and towards something (Being or 
‘the living ontology’) that wants to be expressed. 
‘Lived understanding’ and ‘lived philosophy’ will be 
understood and articulated if we are able to 
philosophize with these kinds of ‘loaded words’.  
 
Poetic words are indeed also ‘loaded words’. 
However, we have already noted that to philosophize 
is not the same as to poetize. However, I believe that 
philosophical ideas are inherently poetic just as good 
poetry is inherently philosophical. Karen Blixen, the 
Danish author of Out of Africa, Babette’s Feast and 
Seven Gothic Tales, underlines this when she writes, 
“No one becomes a great poet today without a 
coherent philosophy of life” (cited in Wivel, 1987, p. 
90). Again there seems to be an intimate relationship 
between poetry and philosophy or, more broadly 
speaking, between art and philosophy.  
 
“Where language is, there Being itself is not yet or 
no more” (Karl Jaspers) 
 
In order to qualify what Socratic Wonder and 
Midwifery are, and why this Socratic approach has to 
balance the Poetic Dwelling approach in 
phenomenological research, I now turn to a more 
fundamental philosophical disagreement between 
Heidegger’s view of ‘poetized philosophizing’ though 
Gelassenheit, and Karl Jaspers’, Gadamer’s and 
Arendt’s view on Socratic wonderment through 
‘dialogical and dialectical philosophizing’.  
 
As the Canadian philosopher Francisco Gonzalez 
(2009) has so thoroughly shown us, Heidegger saw 
phenomenology and dialectic as fire and water, that 
is, as two approaches that one could not and should 
not mix. His basic objection was that dialectic “steps 
into an already constructed context” (Heidegger, 
1923/1995, p. 43) and “always lives from the table of 
others” (p. 45). When philosophizing in this way we 
too easily find ourselves in a kind of repetition of 
what has already coagulated in thoughts and 
worldviews as well as in empty abstractions and 
generalized concepts and words that are only vein 
representations of the phenomena. Heidegger 
(1923/1995) posits that words that are delivered from 
Socratic dialectics are not words that are, so to speak, 
loaded with the authentic and original experience and 
meeting with the phenomena. Dialectics is therefore, 
he announces in Being and Time, “a genuine 
philosophical embarrassment” (Heidegger, 1923/1995 
p. 25), which becomes superfluous with Aristotle. 
Although dialectics might help us to transcend idle 
talk through critical destruction of concepts and 
words that have objectified the phenomena, for 
Heidegger it always remains subordinated to pure 
seeing (‘reines Vernehmen’). Dialectics only move 
forward by taking standpoints and by playing one 
received standpoint against another. The fundamental 
demand of phenomenology, on the other hand, is to 
look away from all standpoints (Heidegger, 
1919/1999). According to Heidegger, Aristotle was 
“… in the clear about the phenomena, he saw them 
directly and without distortion, while Plato, on 
account of his dialectic, remained mired in the 
ambiguities and deceptions of Logos” (Gonzalez, 
2009, p. 10).  
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Thus, in short, according to Heidegger, Socratic 
dialectics becomes too rational and too rigid and 
‘non-philosophical’. This occurs because dialectics 
prevents us from being in touch with the subject 
matter itself and from seeing the phenomena in a 
direct pure and intuitive seeing (nous). Heidegger 
posits that we will only be able to reach this 
philosophical insight or summit through a poetizing 
philosophy and dwelling. This direct saying and 
seeing can, if we follow Heidegger, only be done in 
solitude, in lonely dwelling; in the same way, he 
would probably say, as a good poem cannot be 
created in communion with other people as a common 
project. Before the poem can be expressed it must be 
felt and experienced as an inner and silent dialogue 
with oneself and one’s relation to the world. In this 
way solitary Poetic Dwelling seems to be superior to 
Socratic Wonder and shared dialogue.  
 
This discussion of Heidegger’s ideas leads to 
questions regarding the work of Gadamer. Why is it 
that Gadamer (1985) tells us that his philosophical 
hermeneutics must be located between existential 
phenomenology and Socratic dialectic? Why does 
Gadamer (2002) criticise Heidegger for performing a 
monological and too closed form of philosophizing? 
Gadamer (1989) claims that it is in the tension or 
balance between the phenomenological and 
dialectical movements, what I here will call the lyrical 
impulse and the Socratic impulse, that the 
hermeneutical ‘event of understanding’ and ‘truth 
experience’ take place. According Gadamer (1989), 
the phenomenological momentum can help us to 
obtain the near; in other words, to be sensuously and 
honestly where we are at a particular time and place. 
However, the hermeneutic momentum can help us to 
think critically and to be modest about our certainty 
and knowledge of where we are. Thus, Gadamer 
(1989) also wants us to question our ‘intuitions’ and 
evocations and our so-called ‘pure seeing’ through a 
genuine and critical as well as existential dialogue 
between two or more interlocutors. This critical and 
existential thinking is what Socratic dialogue and 
dialectics can foster in the interlocutors. According to 
Gadamer (1989), our feelings, moods and intuitions 
are always coloured by the fundamental ideas, 
philosophical assumptions, lived worldviews and pre-
understandings in which we are embedded when we 
listen to our feelings, moods and intuitions. As a 
result the only thing we can do to get as close as we 
can to the phenomenon itself, is to put our 
fundamental assumptions, our understandings, our 
feelings, moods and intuitions in play in a shared 
questioning. He argues that only the gods can see a 
phenomenon directly without looking through a ‘dark 
glass’ and therefore even ‘the inner word’ is to be 
taken up and questioned in a Socratic dialogue 
(Gadamer, 1989).  
 
However, Logos and rationally developed arguments 
are not going to decide whether this or that is more 
true than something else. Instead, according to 
Gadamer (1989), Socratic Midwifery (maieutics) and 
dialetics (in contrast to Hegelian rational dialectics 
and maybe even Ricoeur’s ‘critical dialectics’) show 
us the limits of language and the fundamental finitude 
of the rational and critical thought. Gonzalez (2009) 
has the following to say about the ‘third dialectical 
way’ between pure intuition (Heidegger) and 
conceptual mediation (Hegel):  
 
Plato’s dialectic absolutizes neither conceptual 
mediation nor intuition; on the contrary, by 
continually opposing the one to the other, it 
exposes the finitude of each. By revealing our 
inability to say all that we see as well as our 
inability to see with perfect clarity all that we 
say, dialectic exposes the limitations of both 
our seeing and our saying. Heidegger is the 
one who, in dismissing dialectic, is continually 
in danger of presuming too much for language 
and intuition. (p. 290) 
 
Thus, though his dialectical and always negating 
movements, which at first glance seem to lead us 
nowhere, Socrates nevertheless indirectly points 
beyond language and logos to a way of being that has 
a musicality for ‘that’ which cannot be spoken or 
thought but only lived. On this point Karl Jaspers, 
Hannah Arendt and Gabriel Marcel are in agreement. 
They all agree that it is not what the interlocutors in a 
Socratic dialogue explicitly express in clear words, 
strong arguments and consistent concepts and 
definitions that should catch our attention but rather 
the silence, hesitation, reluctance, prudence, 
slowness, openness and listening attitude as well as 
the truth-seeking passion, love, playfulness, humour 
and, of course, the wonder that follows the words or 
pauses between the words. In this regard, the French 
philosopher Pierre Hadot (1995, p. 155) writes: 
  
To be sure, Socrates was a passionate lover of 
words and dialogue. With just as much 
passion, however, he sought to demonstrate to 
us the limits of language. What he wanted to 
show us is that we can never understand 
justice if we do not live it. Justice, like every 
authentic reality, is indefinable, and this is 
what Socrates sought to make his interlocutor 
understand, in order to urge him to ‘live’ 
justice.  
 
This point was also argued by the Danish philosopher 
Søren Kierkegaard, who stated that it is through a 
‘Socratic Eros’ (in the tension between the temporal 
and eternity, between contingency and metaphysics, 
between the ontic and ontological) in the in-between 
161
This volume page number is not for bibliographic reference purposes 
that you must find the spirit of the Socratic dialogue 
and dialectics (see also Kirkland, 2007).  
 
Gadamer (1986b) and Gonzalez (2009) have argued 
that Heidegger’s critique of the Socratic dialectics 
builds on false ground because Heidegger seems to 
read the Socratic dialectics in the way that Hegel 
understood dialectic. However, the existential 
dialectic that Socrates practiced was actually in 
contrast to the Hegelian dialectics, as Kierkegaard 
(1841/1997, 1846/2007) was probably the first to see. 
The Socratic dialectics points to what Plato in the 
Seventh Letter (Plato, 1961; Rhodes, 2003) described 
as the unsayable dimension in philosophizing. It is 
exactly this silent region of Being, which Socratic 
dialogue and dialectic in an indirect way point to, 
which the Community of Wonder helps us to sense. 
 
In a letter to Heidegger dated 6 August 1949, Karl 
Jaspers objects to Heidegger’s characterization of 
language as the “house of Being” he states that “… 
but in communication [Mitteilen] language is to be 
brought to its self-overcoming in reality itself, 
through action, presence, love. I could almost say the 
inverse: where language is, there Being itself is not 
yet or no more” (Jaspers & Heidegger, 1990, p. 179; 
see also Gonzalez, 2008, p. 389). Thus, according to 
Gadamer and Jaspers direct saying and pure seeing 
through language are not possible regardless of the 
strength of our phenomenological attitude or state of 
wonder. However, in wonder we transcend our 
language and get in touch with the world in a way that 
brings new life to the words we use to express the 
impression that life makes on us. Or, as St. Augustine 
said, “Wonder strikes our heart without hurting it.13” 
Through wonder we silently experience an 
ontological homecoming before language – the word 
and the question – arise. Therefore it is also said that 
the phenomenology of wonder is connected to a deep 
experience of gratitude, awe and trust in life. In those 
moments we experience what Arendt (1978) calls 
‘admiring wonder’.  
 
However, although Gadamer rightly writes that 
“Being that is understood is language” (Gadamer, 
1989, p. 470), we could also add that being that is not 
understood might be wonder and action in the sense 
suggested by Jaspers (Jaspers & Heidegger, 1990). In 
a Community of Wonder and Socratic dialectical 
dialogue where we deliberately seek to place our 
thoughts and awareness at their ‘wits end’ by 
unfreezing our concepts, words and ideas, language is 
brought to its self-overcoming in reality itself. We do 
this in order to find a new beginning (natality; Arendt, 
1958, 1978), which can resonate better than the “old 
words, ideas and worldview” (Jaspers & Heidegger, 
1990, p. 179), better than the old former used words, 
                                                 
13 See footnote 11. 
ideas and worldview with our present lived 
experience of ‘action, presence and love’.   
 
To reiterate my point: Poetic Dwelling can help us to 
obtain a resonance with Being or the Voice of Life, 
but Socratic Wonder can help us to find our personal 
response to this calling. It is through this ‘I-Thou’-
relation, in this dance between Poetic Dwelling and 
Socratic Wonder, or the lyrical and Socratic impulse 
in the phenomenological research practice, that we 
must find our way. However, if we think from the 
start that we are and should be in control of this dance 
we will not reach a true community of wonder.  
 
To philosophize and to wonder is not something we 
can do. It is not possible to do anything with 
philosophy. Instead, to cite Heidegger (1961, p. 10), 
might not philosophy, if we concern ourselves with it, 
do something with us? To get into a thinking and into 
a wonderment is an event, where something is 
happening to us. In wonder, human beings are taken 
by life or Being; in wonder, we transcend our 
ordinary conception and understanding of ‘the world 
of appearance’ (Arendt, 1978), and arrive at the world 
as if for the first time. In wonder, we witness a 
‘world-ing’; that is, a world that is coming to be here-
and-now. This makes the I (in Buber’s sense) wonder. 
In wonder, the ‘I’ comes to him- or herself and to the 
world in which he or she is already embedded. In 
wonder, our heart, to speak with St. Augustine, is out 
in the world wandering around. The heart is struck by 
wonder but not at all hurt by it, rather wonder awakes 
and enlivens the heart. In wonder, through a Socratic 
Eros for wisdom, we strive to understand in the 
ontological and existential sense that Heidegger and 
Gadamer refer to when writing of a ‘hermeneutic 
understanding’.  
 
Conclusion – or sortie: 
 
I hope I have made a worthwhile case for considering 
whether we, as phenomenological researchers in the 
human sciences, should also take a Socratic approach 
when doing phenomenology. I hope I have also 
convincingly argued for why wonder and 
wonderment cannot simply be described through the 
psychological vocabulary and approach. Finally, I 
also hope that I have created some ‘clearings’ and 
inspired the reader to start wondering about the 
differences and similarities between Poetic Dwelling 
and Socratic Wonder, and helped the reader 
understand why being in wonder cannot be identified 
with being curious, surprised or having a deep 
interest.  
 
As an example, when Halling (2008, 2010), Halling, 
Kunz and Rowe (1994) and Halling, Leifer and Rowe 
(2006) write about ‘dialogal phenomenology’ they are 
inspired by Gadamer and Jaspers but only focus on 
162 
This volume page number is not for bibliographic reference purposes
‘dialogue’ and not on Socratic dialectics, although 
this is paramount for both Gadamer and Jaspers. 
Halling et al. (1994, 2006) do not focus explicitly on 
wonder but talk about it as synonymous with surprise 
and deep interest. Thus, although they do break 
through to new and interesting ways of doing modern 
phenomenological research by bringing in the need 
for phenomenological researchers to meet in a 
dialogue and shared questioning around the 
phenomena in order to call the phenomena alive, they 
remain in a hybrid of ‘descriptive scientific 
phenomenology’ (in the sense of Giorgi) and continue 
to listen to the evocative and intuitive ‘hearings’ (of 
meaning, lived experience, essence) like Dahlberg 
and Todres and Galvin. These authors do not seem to 
question, in a Socratic and dialectical way, the 
intuitions and evocations they receive from 
investigating the lived experiences in their research.  
 
What is needed here, in my opinion, is a ‘wonder-
based dialogal phenomenology’; a phenomenology 
where Socratic critical and dialectical thinking and 
questioning is allowed and where a Community of 
Wonder and not ‘just’ a Community of Inquiry is 
displayed and practiced. Max van Manen’s 
hermeneutic ‘practice phenomenology’ is a way of 
doing phenomenology that contains both the ‘lyrical 
impulse’ and the ‘Socratic impulse’. He is very 
explicit concerning the importance of having a truly 
wonder-based approach when doing phenomenology. 
The only critical remark I have regarding his ‘practice 
phenomenology’ is that I feel that he places too much 
emphasis on phenomenological research as a writing 
and reading enterprise. Through this emphasis he 
seems to support the Heideggerian ‘lonely-cowboy-
thinking’ and poetic philosophizing. In this position, I 
miss the importance of ‘the living word’ and 
dialectical Socratic dialogue and shared questioning 
between living and physically present phenomeno-
logical researchers.  
 
In this article I hope I have pointed out why a 
wonder-based and Socratic phenomenology is also 
needed. In addition, I hope I have shown why there is 
a need for a vocabulary in phenomenological research 
that is not too loaded with the tonality of 
psychological language, which dominates current 
phenomenological research practices, particularly in 
the human sciences. What remains to be seen and 
elaborated is a more developed phenomenology of 
Wonder, as well as a phenomenological description of 
the practice of a Community of Wonder.  
 
In addition, questions remain concerning how we can 
prepare or create an ‘inviting space’ for the event of 
wonder and a Community of Wonder. Here it would 
be natural, at least for me, to not just describe lived 
experiences phenomenologically through doing 
Socratic Dialogue Groups and Philosophical 
Counselling sessions and other philosophical 
practices with nurses, counsellors and teachers, which 
I personally have been facilitating over the years, but 
also to describe and critically discuss some of the 
theories and understandings underlying the different 
approaches in philosophical counselling and 
practices.  
 
However, at the end of the day it is in the practice, in 
the concrete lived experience of doing Socratic 
dialogue and dialectics (and led by the Socratic 
virtues that these forms of dialogues demand), that we 
will hear and understand that Poetic Dwelling and 
Socratic Wonder are not the same. It is in practice that 
we will see that it is in the dance, or balance, between 
these two movements that a true wonderment and 
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